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06/09/2020 | Report
Yemen Country Security Report
5/28/2026 |
Report
Yemen Country Security Report
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Published: May 28, 2026
This report is intended to supplement the U.S. Department of State Yemen Travel Advisory and Yemen Country Information Page.
Embassy & Consulate Contact Information
U.S. Embassy Sana’a suspended operations in 2015 due to the ongoing civil conflict. The Yemen Affairs Unit (YAU), provisionally resident at U.S. Embassy Riyadh, continues U.S. diplomatic work to Yemen.
Tel: +966 (11) 488-3800
OSAC Country Chapter(s)
There is no Country Chapter in Yemen.
Contact OSAC’s Middle East & North Africa team with any questions.
Yemen Travel Advisory
The current U.S. Department of State Travel Advisory at the date of this report’s publication assesses that travelers should not travel to Yemen due to terrorism, civil unrest, crime, health risks, kidnapping, and landmines.
Crime
The U.S. Department of State has assessed Yemen as being a CRITICAL-threat location for crime directed at or affecting official U.S. government interests.
The U.S. Department of State has included a Crime “C” Indicator on the Travel Advisory for Yemen, indicating that there may be widespread violent crime and/or organized crime present in the country, and/or that local law enforcement may have limited ability to respond to serious crimes.
Crime: General Threat
Yemen is often rated as one of the world’s most fragile states due to the ongoing conflict, exemplified by an increased crime rate and a decrease in law enforcement. The instability created by Yemen’s security, economic, and social conditions has created a fertile environment for crime and corruption both in the areas controlled by the Houthis and the internationally recognized government. Despite the prevalence of checkpoints throughout the country, criminal activities such as kidnapping, petty theft, carjacking, scams, abuses, sexual harassment, assault, murder, violence, looting, and robbery are increasing at an alarming rate.
Crime: Areas of Concern
Human trafficking and arms trafficking are prevalent among organized crime groups in Yemen and have been exacerbated by instability, poverty, and widespread corruption. Some large tribes in Yemen operate with mafia-like characteristics and are involved in numerous criminal markets such as human trafficking and smuggling through the use of violence. Burglaries and home invasions are becoming more common, especially in the areas of direct conflict. Due to parallel governance structures and the current security environment local law enforcement have very limited ability or willingness to respond to crimes.
Review OSAC’s reports, All That You Should Leave Behind, Hotels: The Inns and Outs, Considerations for Hotel Security, Taking Credit, and Our Two Cents: Petty Crime Basics and How to Minimize the Risk.
Kidnapping Threat
The U.S. Department of State has included a Kidnapping “K” Indicator on the Travel Advisory for Yemen, indicating that criminal or terrorist individuals or groups have threatened to and/or have seized or detained and threatened to kill, injure, or continue to detain individuals in order to compel a third party (including a governmental organization) to do or abstain from doing something as a condition of release.
Since the beginning of Yemen’s civil war in 2015, rebel groups in Sana’a have systematically and unlawfully detained U.S. citizens, particularly dual U.S.-Yemeni citizens. Reports indicate that criminals target U.S. citizens by virtue of their citizenship, regardless of the amount of time they have spent in Yemen, their established connections with rebel groups, or their connections with local businesses or humanitarian organizations aimed at providing relief to those in need. U.S. citizens, especially youth, are also at risk of kidnapping for purposes of forced marriages. During detentions, which in some cases have lasted well over a year, U.S. citizens have not been able to contact their families or receive U.S. consular visits or those from international humanitarian organizations. U.S. government direct assistance to U.S. citizens in detention is severely limited, since there has been no U.S. diplomatic presence in Yemen following the Houthi rebel takeover of Sana’a.
Review OSAC’s reports, Kidnapping: The Basics and Active Shooter and Kidnapping Response Tips.
Terrorism
The U.S. Department of State has assessed Yemen as being a CRITICAL-threat location for terrorism directed at or affecting official U.S. government interests.
The U.S. Department of State has included a Terrorism “T” Indicator on the Travel Advisory for Yemen, indicating that terrorist attacks have occurred and/or specific threats against civilians, groups, or other targets may exist.
The threat posed by violent extremist groups in Yemen remains high, most notably in al-Bayda, Abyan, and Shabwah governorates. Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has expanded its influence in Yemen since the beginning of the conflict. Because of the instability and violence in Yemen, the internationally recognized government cannot effectively enforce counterterrorism measures, and a large security vacuum persists. AQAP has benefitted from the conflict by significantly expanding its presence in the southern and eastern governorates. ISIS has also established a presence in Yemen and claimed responsibility for several deadly attacks throughout Yemen since 2016. Methods include suicide bombings, vehicle-borne IEDs (VBIEDs), ambushes, kidnappings, and targeted assassinations. All governorates of Yemen have witnessed violence due to conflicts between the Houthis, tribal militias, government forces, and a range of non-state actors, including AQAP and ISIS.
The U.S. government remains extremely concerned about possible attacks against U.S. citizens (whether visiting or residing in Yemen), U.S. private-sector facilities, and perceived U.S. and Western interests.
Political Violence and Civil Unrest
The U.S. Department of State has assessed Yemen as being a CRITICAL-threat location for political violence directed at or affecting official U.S. government interests.
The U.S. Department of State has included a Civil Unrest “U” Indicator on the Travel Advisory for Yemen, indicating that demonstrations, protests, and/or strikes occur frequently, and/or that local law enforcement may have limited ability to respond adequately. Civil unrest can develop quickly without prior notice, often interrupting logistics and services. Avoid demonstration activity, as even those planned to remain peaceful have the potential to turn violent.
Elections/Political Stability
For nearly a decade, Yemen’s civil conflict has exacerbated one of the world’s worst food security emergencies and engendered a war economy that further disadvantages the most vulnerable. The protracted war has drawn in neighboring states; it has led to collapsed state institutions, local power vacuums and ungoverned spaces that militias and terrorists are exploiting to threaten close regional allies. The war has complicated ongoing counterterrorism efforts and has provided Iran a space to pursue its own ambitions in Yemen, further threatening regional stability.
Instability and ongoing threats in Yemen are at a severe level. During the 2015-2022 conflict, the Saudi led coalition (SLC) conducted numerous airstrikes and these, combined with artillery strikes by warring parties led to high levels of civilian casualties.
In December 2020, the Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG) officially returned to Aden, although the city continues to experience demonstrations and periodic violence between competing factions.
The Saudi-led coalition and the Houthis agreed to a formal ceasefire in 2022 which subsequently lasted six months and resulted in a pause between significant acts of cross-border military activity and contained violence to lower levels in more isolated pockets of the country. Though the formal ceasefire expired in October 2022, there remains a significant decrease in cross-border attacks compared to prior to the 2022 ceasefire. . While the peace plan is still being negotiated, a resurgence of conflict remains possible given the intense political instability in the country.
Protests & Demonstrations
The Houthis have frequently encouraged protests in Sana’a against the SLC, and, in some cases, at UN offices and those of other international NGOs. The Israel-Hamas conflict and the Houthis’ subsequent attacks in the Red Sea region has also been a catalyst for protests within Yemen. In January, after the Southern Transitional Council (STC) separatist group dismantled itself, a large crowd rallied in Aden in support of the secession of the south and for the STC and Aden continues to experience political demonstrations on a regular basis.
Review OSAC’s report, Surviving a Protest.
Anti-U.S./Anti-Western Sentiment
The security environment is not hospitable to U.S. citizens. The Houthi slogan of “Death to America, Death to Israel, Curse the Jews, Victory to Islam” exemplifies anti-U.S. sentiment of the rebel group. Local staff employed by the now-closed U.S. Embassy have been imprisoned due to their affiliation with the U.S.
Law Enforcement
The emergency line in Yemen is 199; the service is unreliable, and the operators do not speak English.
The internationally recognized Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG) maintains several security agencies, though its actual control is limited. In January 2024, the Political Security Organization (PSO) and the National Security Bureau merged into a centralized agency – the Central State Security Agency.
The Interior Ministry manages the Criminal Investigation Division, the paramilitary Special Security Forces, and the counterterrorism unit. The Defense Ministry commands units that respond to domestic unrest. However, while the ROYG staffs these agencies in areas it nominally controls, tribal leaders and local military commanders effectively govern large portions of the country. The ROYG armed forces are rebuilding while fighting both the Houthis and Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), working alongside Saudi forces.
Yemen's security landscape is fragmented across areas of control. Houthi forces control most military infrastructure and weapons in the north, while the Southern Transitional Council (STC) controlled security in much of the south until early 2026 when the group dissolved. Civilian authorities lack effective control over security forces throughout the country, and credible reports indicate that security forces on all sides have committed abuses.
In ROYG-controlled areas, police and security units nominally fall under the Ministry of Interior, but competing tribal, party, and sectarian influences have weakened government authority. This includes Aden, despite it being the seat of government, and is especially true in other areas historically under STC control. The most common agencies include the Special Security Forces (SSF), which patrol and staff checkpoints; the Emergency Police (Najda); and the General Police, which operate from police stations and respond to criminal activity. However, police may require payment before providing security support. In Houthi-controlled areas, security forces report to either the Houthi Interior Ministry or the Revolutionary Committee. Residents typically encounter the Special Security Forces and other Revolutionary Committee units that patrol and staff checkpoints.
Police Response
Police response throughout Yemen is limited, with tribal or paramilitary forces often serving as de facto authorities, particularly in rural areas where formal police presence is minimal or nonexistent.
Police stations are clearly identified with signs. Police officers on foot and in locations throughout major cities are also easy to find; however, it is very rare to find a police officer who can speak English.
Checkpoints: Police and military checkpoints – official and unofficial – are common and may appear with little or no advance notice. Those staffing check points generally do not wear police uniforms, which makes it difficult to recognize and differentiate police checkpoints from military or local tribal checkpoints. Sana’a and other Houthi-controlled cities are not safe for foreigners. Those manning checkpoints will likely stop foreigners, interrogate, possibly arrest them, and take them to the nearest police station. Yemenis who also possess any other foreign citizenship should carry their National Yemeni IDs to avoid targeting at checkpoints.
Armed Conflict
Yemen's armed conflict, ongoing since the Houthi takeover of Sana'a in 2014-2015, involves multiple actors and fronts. The Iran-backed Houthis control northern Yemen and from October 2023 to December 2024 attacked international shipping in the Red Sea following the Gaza War's outbreak. U.S. forces escalated strikes against the Houthis from March to May 2025 until an Oman-brokered agreement halted mutual hostilities, though the Houthis resumed limited attacks on non-U.S. vessels and Israeli targets in July 2025. After suspending attacks following the October 2025 Israel-Hamas ceasefire, the Houthis resumed attacks in March.
The underlying conflict remains unresolved, with the Houthis posing continued threats to shipping and regional partners.
In December 2025 and January 2026, Saudi Arabia intervened militarily against the UAE-backed STC reversing its seizure of eastern governorates and Aden, which forced the UAE withdrawal from Yemen.
Transportation
Road Safety
Travel by road in Yemen is risky. Although there are traffic officers everywhere, driving around Sana’a and all other Yemeni cities is extremely hazardous. Authorities do not enforce standard driving and traffic rules, and drivers mostly ignore the instructions and existence of traffic officers. It is common to see a person driving on the wrong side of the road or at high rates of speed. Most vehicles do not meet U.S. safety standards. Many vehicles lack proper lighting or mirrors and are unlicensed. If they exist, traffic lights may not be in working condition, and street lights are often non-functioning due to a lack of electricity.
Streets are crowded with motorcycles, which mostly are unlicensed and used as taxis; motorcyclists are often involved in accidents, since they do not have dedicated lanes and drivers do not obey the traffic rules. It is common to see underage drivers or heavy trucks moving in the main streets during the day. Street hazards include large potholes, which are widespread due to a lack of maintenance and unmarked speed bumps. Traveling on the roads between cities can be very dangerous due to carjacking and kidnapping, which mostly target foreigners.
Traffic accidents are common due to a lack of obedience with basic traffic rules and poor vehicle maintenance. Drivers of all types of vehicles may drive under the influence of qat, considered a Schedule 1 narcotic in the U.S.
Saudi Arabia has reinforced its concrete-filled security barrier along sections of the fully demarcated border with Yemen to stem illegal cross-border activities.
For detailed, country-specific road and vehicle safety information, read the World Health Organization’s Global Status Report on Road Safety.
Review OSAC’s reports, Road Safety Abroad, Driving Overseas: Best Practices, and Evasive Driving Techniques; and read the U.S. Department of State’s webpage on driving and road safety abroad.
Public Transportation Safety
Public transportation is limited and highly discouraged due to safety and security concerns.
Aviation Concerns
The United States is concerned about the risk to civil aviation operating in specified areas of the Sana’a Flight Information Region (FIR) due to the ongoing military operations, political instability, and violence from competing armed groups involved in combat operations and other military-related activity. The FAA has prohibited U.S. civil aviation from flying in specific areas within the FIR.
Review OSAC’s Report, Security in Transit: Airplanes, Public Transport, and Overnights.
Maritime Security
There is currently a high risk to commercial vessels operating within or near Yemen’s territorial waters. Regional conflict, military activity, and piracy pose significant threats to commercial vessels operating in the Southern Red Sea, Bab-al-Mandeb Strait, Northwest Indian Ocean, Arabian Sea, and the Gulf of Aden. Vessels operating in these regions, including near the island of Socotra, should operate under a heightened state of alert, as increasing tensions in the region increase the potential for direct or collateral damage to vessels transiting the area.
Since November 2023, the Houthis have launched attacks on commercial and military ships in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. This series has included hijackings, harassment of vessels using speed boats, and a barrage of drones and missiles. The Houthis allege to be targeting U.S.- and Israeli-owned vessels but have attacked ships with ties to over 40 different countries.
Piracy in the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Indian Ocean remains a security threat to maritime activities in the region. The United States Maritime Administration (MARAD) advises that elevated regional tensions have increased the risk of maritime attacks by extremists to vessels operating in the Gulf of Oman, North Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden, and the Bab al Mandeb regions.
MARAD recommends vessels at anchor, operating in restricted maneuvering environments, or at slow speeds should be especially vigilant and report suspicious activity. U.S. flag vessels that observe suspicious activity in the area should report such suspicious activity or any hostile or potentially hostile action to the COMUSNAVCENT Battlewatch Captain at +973-1785-3879. Report all suspicious activities and events to the U.S. Coast Guard National Response Center at 1-800-424-8802, 1-202-267-2675, or TDD 1-202-267-4477. Review the Department of State’s International Maritime Piracy Fact Sheet.
Mariners planning travel to Yemen should check for U.S. maritime advisories and alerts on the MARAD website, the U.S. Coast Guard homeport website, and the NGA broadcast warnings website.
Travelers with Special Considerations
For specific traveler concerns in Yemen, review the local laws and circumstances on the Department of State’s Country Information Page.
Rule of Law, Arbitrary Detention, Official Harassment, Corruption, & Transparency
The U.S. Department of State has not included a Risk of Wrongful Detention “D” Indicator on the Travel Advisory for Yemen.
Although the law prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention, both continue to occur because most Yemenis working in law enforcement have not received salaries for several years or are paid very low salaries, fostering an environment ripe for corruption. Those in Houthi-controlled areas have accused U.S. citizens of being spies for the U.S. Government, subjecting them to strict surveillance and arbitrary detention. Detainees face torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment or punishment. Prison conditions are mostly harsh and life threatening, and do not meet international standards. While the law provides for criminal penalties for official corruption, the government did not implement the law effectively.
Corruption is pervasive throughout the country, and observers reported petty corruption in nearly every government office. Job applicants were often expected to purchase their positions. Observers believed tax inspectors undervalued assessments and pocketed the difference. Many government officials and civil service employees received salaries for jobs they did not perform or multiple salaries for the same job. Corruption also regularly affected government procurement.
UN reporting also identified corruption among Houthi-controlled entities, including in selection of civil appointments, intimidation of opponents, and diversion of humanitarian aid.
The UN stated it found reasonable grounds to believe that all parties to the conflict engaged in arbitrary detention. Local NGOs reported arrests by unidentified authorities; frequent incommunicado detentions for long periods of time; and torture and other forms of cruel, inhuman treatment during detention.
Persons arrested were frequently denied their constitutional right to be charged within 24 hours. The law prohibits arrests or serving subpoenas between sundown and dawn, but local NGOs reported forces, including but not limited to the government of Yemen, the Houthis, and the Southern Transitional Council, took some persons suspected of crimes from their homes at night without warrants.
Health Concerns
The U.S. Department of State has included a Health “H” Indicator on the Travel Advisory for Yemen, indicating that Health risks, including current disease outbreaks or a crisis that temporarily disrupts a country’s medical infrastructure, are present. Review the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s (CDC) country-specific Travel Health Notices for current health issues that impact traveler health, like disease outbreaks, special events or gatherings, and natural disasters.
There are various medical clinics and hospitals throughout Sana’a, but not all facilities offer full medical services, and emergency care is limited. Medical care outside Sana’a is even more limited.
The emergency line in Yemen is 199; the service is unreliable, and the operators do not speak English. Due to the lack of reliable street addresses, emergency callers should provide directions based on prominent landmarks and prepare to meet the ambulance upon arrival. Prepare directions and keep them by the phone. If you can safely transport the patient to the hospital by private vehicle, you may avoid a potentially long wait for an ambulance. It is important to know the quickest and shortest routes to the main emergency facilities. Due to the ongoing civil unrest, medical facilities may not be readily available.
Female Patients: A male relative’s consent is often required before a woman can be admitted to a hospital, creating significant problems in a humanitarian context in which the men of the household are absent or dead.
Cholera: Active cholera transmission is widespread in Yemen. Cholera is rare in travelers but can be severe when contracted. Certain factors may increase the risk of getting cholera or having severe disease. Avoiding unsafe food and water and washing your hands can also help prevent cholera.
Malaria: All areas below 2,000 m (6,562 ft) in altitude have risk of malaria, though there is none in Sana’a. Avoid mosquito bites. Consider taking chemoprophylaxis before, during, and after travel to prevent malaria, depending on travel plans such as where you are going, when you are traveling, and if you are spending a lot of time outdoors or sleeping outside. See more detailed information from the CDC about malaria in Yemen.
Rabies: Rabies can be found in dogs, bats, and other mammals in Yemen.
Find contact information for available medical services and available air ambulance services on the U.S. Embassy website. The U.S. Department of State strongly recommends purchasing international health insurance before traveling internationally. Review the U.S. Department of State’s webpage on health insurance overseas.
See OSAC’s Guide to U.S. Government-Assisted Evacuations; review OSAC’s reports, The Healthy Way, Shaken: The Don’ts of Alcohol Abroad, Health 101: How to Prepare for Travel, and Fire Safety Abroad; and visit the U.S. Department of State’s webpage on Your Health Abroad for more information.
Vaccinations
Review the CDC Travelers’ Health site for country-specific vaccine recommendations.
Issues Traveling with Medications
Bring all necessary medications with you to Yemen.
Review OSAC’s report, Traveling with Medication.
Water Quality
Tap water is not potable in Yemen.
Review OSAC’s report, I’m Drinking What in My Water?
Natural Disasters
The U.S. Department of State has not included a Natural Disaster “N” Indicator on the Travel Advisory for Yemen.
Roads are hazardous during rainy seasons due to a lack of adequate drainage. Flash floods pose a significant safety concern and may occur with little or no warning, even in Sana’a. There are sandstorms and dust storms in summer.
Yemen has limited volcanic activity; Jebel at Tair, which forms an island in the Red Sea, erupted in 2007 after awakening from dormancy; other historically active volcanoes include Harra of Arhab, Harras of Dhamar, Harra es-Sawad, and Jebel Zubair, although many of these have not erupted in over a century.
Cybersecurity
Privacy rights face routine and arbitrary infringement throughout the country. Houthi security actors search homes and private offices, monitor telephone calls, read personal mail, and email, and otherwise intrude into personal matters without legally issued warrants or judicial supervision. The law requires that the attorney general personally authorize telephone call monitoring and reading of personal mail and email, but there is no indication the law is followed in practice. There have been notable cases of Houthi intrusion into cyberspace. The Houthi-controlled Public Telecommunications Corporation systematically blocks user access to websites and internet domains it deems dangerous to the rebel actors’ political agenda.
Counterintelligence Issues
Do not bring any proprietary or personal information to Yemen that would bring harm if disclosed.
Import/Export Restrictions
Yemen is a member of the major treaties administered by the World Intellectual Property Organization, having acceded to the Berne Convention on Copyright in 2008, to the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property in 2007 and the WIPO convention in 1979. However, due to the current conflict and limited government control over state institutions, authorities do not enforce intellectual property rights (IPR) effectively. The Ministry of Industry and Trading’s opening of a second IP office in Aden in 2018 independent of the Houthi-controlled IP office in Sana’a raised rights-holder concerns that they would have to file duplicate trademark applications with both registries, and that third parties could use the opportunity to register duplicate trademarks in bad faith.
Conflict has crippled Yemen’s economy and leads to frequent volatility in exchange rate and prices. Due to the limited penetration of the formal banking sector, many exchange transactions proceed through unregulated, private money exchange or black-market channels. International Monetary Fund reports highlight gaps in the Central Bank of Yemen’s (CBY) supervisory capacity over the entire financial system, including compliance with anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) standards. Houthi-controlled authorities in Sana’a have arbitrarily shut down exchange businesses and seized new Yemeni Rial (YER) banknotes printed by the CBY in Aden, while the inferior quality of some CBY-printed notes has enabled widespread counterfeiting. Reports from both Sana’a and Aden indicate that a range of criminal groups engage in the distribution of counterfeit YER notes and counterfeit foreign currency.
A number of Yemeni individuals and entities are currently sanctioned under the U.S. Department of Treasury’s Yemen Sanctions Program and other authorities. Check the Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons list prior to undertaking business with any Yemeni individuals or entities.
There are no written restrictions against the use or importation of satellite phones in ROYG-controlled areas, however, restrictions could be leveled in an arbitrary manner. The use of satellite phones in Houthi territory is unlikely to be accepted without prior permission from Houthi authorities.
A country-specific listing of items/goods prohibited from being exported to the country or that are otherwise restricted is available from the U.S. International Trade Agency website.